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The paper explores how the monetary and fiscal policies have coordinated with 
each other in Pakistan. It argues that monetary and fiscal policies have been 
executed independently throughout the study period that is 1964-65 to 2008-09 
and there have been very few instances of coordination between the two policies 
while addressing prevailing economic conditions. The paper does not find any 
difference between the behavior of monetary and fiscal policies before and after 
the establishment of Monetary and Fiscal Policies Coordination Board in 1994. 
Whatever instances of coordination were found were clustered in military 
regimes; which may be one of the reasons of macroeconomic stability in such 
regimes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Different macroeconomic policies are formulated and implemented through 
different institutional arrangements, though broad objective of the policies is 
usually the same, i.e., increasing the material welfare of the people of the country. 
The most dominant policy objectives are achieving high employment and low 
inflation. There are two major groups of policy instruments to achieve these 
objectives; one is related to monetary conditions, that is used by central banks 
with the primary objective of maintaining price stability; and the other to fiscal 
conditions, that is employed by the ministry of finance to improve overall 
economic performance. However, the objectives of fiscal policies are usually 
inclined towards high growth and employment even at cost of high inflation. With 
this dichotomy in policy objectives of monetary and fiscal authorities, there is a 
risk of quashing each other’s actions. It warrants some sort of monetary and fiscal 
policies coordination with arrangement for exchange of information in timely 
                                                 
*: The authors are senior economists at the State Bank of Pakistan; farooq.arby@sbp.org.pk  
4  SBP Research Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 1, May, 2010 
manner and setting mutually agreed targets for key economic indicators. 
Agreement about the targets of output and inflation creates a monetary-fiscal 
symbiosis, yielding the ideal outcome despite disagreement about relative weights 
of the two objectives (Dixit and Lambertini, 2001).  The coordination in this 
context does not put the central bank’s autonomy into the shade. Instead it is to 
ensure effectiveness of both the policies. A non-coordinating behavior of any one 
party not only renders policies ineffective but also adversely affects the credibility 
of both the fiscal and monetary authorities.  
 
The experience of recent global financial and economic crisis fortifies the need for 
coordination among macroeconomic policies to effectively address the shocks. A 
coordinated policy response to economic shocks increases the speed of 
convergence to the steady state and leads the economy closer to the planned target 
as compared to the outcome of the non-cooperative policy moves as noted by 
Tabellini (1986).  Dahan (1998) also stresses on the need for the monetary and 
fiscal policies coordination after studying budgetary implications of central bank’s 
actions and monetary implications of government’s reactions.  
 
The need for policy coordination also arises in the case of structural reforms and 
liberalization of the financial sector. Such reforms can only succeed within the 
framework of a supportive fiscal policy that provides macroeconomic stability, 
fiscal discipline, and avoidance of taxes that discriminate against financial 
activity. Together with improved legal, accounting and regulatory systems in the 
financial sector, these are the prerequisites for successful financial liberalization 
(World Bank, 1989). If high fiscal deficits persist while the authorities are 
undertaking the reforms of the financial sector, interest rates could reach very high 
levels and adversely affect efficiency of the financial system.  
 
Recently the issue of monetary-fiscal policy coordination has been analyzed in a 
number of papers, with an explicit reference to European Monetary Union (EMU).  
The formation of the EMU has given rise to a debate about the appropriate 
relationship between centralized monetary policy on one hand, and decentralized 
fiscal and structural policies on the other. For instance, Catenaro (1999) argues in 
favor of cooperation of fiscal policy with monetary policy stance of the Union. He 
shows when the fiscal authorities internalize the important spillover effects 
originating from their excessively expansionary fiscal policies, they reduce the 
structural inefficiencies, inflation and spending biases. Beetsma and Bovenberg 
(2001) address the question whether the EMU requires coordination of fiscal 
policies and, if so, what form should such coordination take. They investigate how 
decentralized fiscal policy interacts with a centralized monetary policy and 
analyze cases when both monetary and fiscal authorities in EMU are unable to 
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commit to their policy targets. They highlight the importance of having not only 
an explicit target of inflations for central bank but also credible commitment from 
fiscal authority of reducing debt to some sustainable level and then maintaining it.  
 
In case of Pakistan, there is hardly any study on the topic except Hanif and Arby 
(2007). While Hanif and Arby (2007) give a theoretical account of monetary and 
fiscal policies coordination and present a description of the institutional 
arrangements for policy coordination in Pakistan, this paper attempts to explore 
the nature of the relationship between monetary and fiscal policies. In the next 
section, we give a methodology of testing coordination and in section 3 results are 
presented. The last section concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
The question of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies arises only if 
the two institutions are independent, at least operationally. If moves of any one 
institution depend on the actions of or direction from the other, then coordination 
is inherently ensured.  A general perception in case of a central bank in developing 
country like Pakistan is that it is subservient to fiscal authority. It may be true in 
the context of institutional set up; however, the actual execution of monetary 
policy may still be independent of fiscal obligations. Before we examine the 
extent of coordination, it makes sense to test empirically the independence of the 
monetary policy from the fiscal policy. 
 
As tests of independence, we apply Granger causality test on indicators of 
monetary and fiscal policies and also explore the existence of co-integration 
between the two indicators. While the Granger causality test determines the 
impact of past information in one variable on the current value of the other, the 
cointegration test establishes if there is an equilibrium relationship between the 
two variables over the long run. The two institutions are considered independent if 
there is no cointegration and no pair-wise causality in the indicators of their 
respective policy stances. 
 
For Granger causality, we take high-power money to GDP ratio (h) as an indicator 
of monetary policy and budget deficit to GDP ratio (d) as an indicator of fiscal 
policy. Tests of unit root show that both the indicators are zero-order integrated. 
We also apply the test of causality on changes in high-power money and budget 
deficit as an alternative form of monetary and fiscal policies indicators
1
. For test 
                                                 
1 Results of unit root tests are not reported in the paper and can be obtained from the authors. 
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of cointegration, we apply single equation residual based Phillips-Ouliaris (1990)
2
 
test on high-power money (H) and budget deficit (D), both being integrated of 
order one.   
 
Once the independence between the two institutions is observed, the next step is to 
determine the extent of coordination between them given different economic 
shocks. We define coordination as follows.  
 
The growth and inflation are the manifestation of the economic performance. We 
therefore, focus on shocks to inflation and growth to which a policy response is 
needed. The matrix in box 1 gives four possible combinations of shocks to growth 
and inflation, where P and N represent positive and negative shocks. Thus PP 
means positive shocks to both growth and inflation, PN represents a positive 
shock to growth and a negative shock to inflation, and so on. Given these shocks, 
a coordinating behavior could be as given in the policy response matrix (Box 2). 
 
If there is positive shock to both growth and inflation then not only monetary 
policy should be contractionary to curb inflation but fiscal policy should also 
follow suit or at least should not be expansionary. We define this policy 
combination as CC, and one should observe it if there is policy coordination. On 
the other hand, if both growth and inflation are hit by negative shocks then both 
monetary and fiscal policies should be expansionary in their stance in case of 
coordination. This policy combination is denoted as EE in the box 2. 
 
The box 1 has been constructed on the basis of growth and inflation data of 
Pakistan for a period of 1965 to 2009
3
. The shock to growth is deviations of real 
                                                 
2 Since Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) tests are based upon adjusting the conventional statistic using 
Newey-West estimator of error variance, these are robust to serial correlation and (time dependent) 
heteroscedasticity.   
Box 1. Macroeconomic environment matrix 
  Inflation 
  Positive Negative 
Growth 
Positive PP PN 
Negative NP NN 
Box 2. Policy response matrix 
  Monetary policy 
  Contraction Expansion 
Fiscal policy 
Contraction CC CE 
Expansion EC EE 
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GDP growth from sample average and shock to inflation is defined as difference 
between observed inflation from threshold level of inflation for Pakistan as 
worked out by Mubarik (2005). 
 
The monetary policy and fiscal policy stance are defined as change in high power 
money and change in budget deficit respectively, both adjusted for changes in real 
GDP and prices. A positive change represents an expansionary stance and a 
negative change a contractionary stance.  
 
Each cell of the macroeconomic environment matrix and policy response matrix 
contains a set of those years in which the given combinations of shocks and policy 
stance have been observed. The extent of coordination () is then defined as the 
following: 
 
        
  = n(PP ∩ CC) + n(PN ∩ CE) + n(NP ∩ EC) + n(NN ∩ EE) 
 
 is total number of years in the study. 
 
There would be perfect coordination if the four quadrants of macroeconomic 
environment matrix and policy response matrix are congruent (or equivalently 
and no coordination if Interestingly, this definition of coordination 
does not necessarily require existence of a formal institutional set up of the kind 
Monetary and Fiscal Policies Coordination Board (MFCB) of Pakistan. It is a sort 
of revealed coordination which may or may not be an outcome of formal 
consultation between the two institutions. 
 
 
3. Empirical evidence 
 
A visual of the two series of high power money and budget deficit as given in 
figure 1 shows that there is no clear co-movements of the two variables. Although 
it can be conjectured in case of a developing country like Pakistan that high 
budget deficit could be associated with high budgetary borrowing from the central 
bank, as a monetary policy stance what matters is the overall movement in the 
reserve money.  Interestingly, a zero correlation is observed between overall 
reserve money and budget deficit, both adjusted for real output and prices during 
                                                                                                                           
3 Data limitation prevented us from going further backward.  The data on high-power money and M2 
is average of twelve months figures of both the variables which have been obtained from 
International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
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the period from 1965 to 2009. This implies that monetary and fiscal policies 
remained independent of each other in Pakistan.
4
  
 
 
A similar conclusion is drawn from the results of Granger causality and Phillips-
Ouliaris cointegration tests. The pair-wise Granger test of causality as reported in 
table 1 shows that neither the ratio of high power money to GDP (h) caused 
budget deficit/GDP (d) nor budget deficit /GDP caused it. Similarly, growth rates 
of high power money and budget deficit also do not cause each other. 
 
Table 1. Pair-wise Granger causality tests  
Sample: 1965 2009     
Number of Observations = 43, Lags: 2  
 Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob. 
 h does not Granger Cause d  0.971 0.388 
 d does not Granger Cause h 0.803 0.455 
 log(H) does not Granger Cause log(D) 0.624 0.541 
 Log(D) does not Granger Cause Log(H) 0.814 0.451 
 
The result of Phillips-Ouliaris (single equation) cointegration test, reported in 
table 2, also supports this outcome. With the null hypothesis of no cointegration, 
both the test statistics (tau and z) show that the series of high power money and 
budget deficit are not cointegrated. It confirms our earlier conclusion that 
monetary and fiscal policies in Pakistan have been independent of each other 
                                                 
4 A multivariate normality test shows that h and d are multivariate normal. Thus zero correlation 
between them implies their independence. 
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Figure 1. Trend of High power money / GDP ratio and Budget deficit / GDP ratio
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irrespective of the institutional standing of the State Bank of Pakistan vis-a-vis 
ministry of finance. 
 
Table 2. Results of Philips-Ouliaris test of cointegration
5
 
Null hypothesis: No Cointegration between Log(H) and Log(D) 
Deterministic variables: intercept,  log(Y), log(P) 
Dependent tau-statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.* 
LOG(H) -3.600 0.200 -20.943 0.159 
LOG(D) -3.685 0.175 -21.817 0.133 
*MacKinnon (1996) p-values. 
    
Given the independence between the indicators of monetary and fiscal policies 
used in this study, the extent of revealed coordination is measured by the ratio 
defined in equation (1) which is based upon the empirical information on 
macroeconomic environment and policy response matrices. As already mentioned, 
each cell of the tables represents a set of years in which the given combination of 
shocks and changes in policy indicators was observed. For example, in box 1a, the 
top-left cell shows the years when real GDP growth was above the sample average 
(5.2 percent) and inflation was higher than the threshold level for Pakistan (9 
percent) as determined by Mubarik (2005). The bottom-left cell shows the years 
when real GDP growth was below sample average and inflation was above the 
threshold. Similarly, in box 2a, the top-left cell shows the years when the value of 
both the fiscal and monetary policy indicators decreased showing contractionary 
stance of both the policies. The bottom-left cell shows the years when the value of 
the fiscal policy indicator increased while that of monetary policy indicator 
decreased.  
 
Box 1a. Macroeconomic environment matrix of Pakistan 
numbers represent end of fiscal year  
  Inflation (deviation from threshold) 
  Positive Negative 
G
ro
w
th
 
(d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 
m
ea
n
) 
Positive 73, 74, 80, 81, 82, 92, 96, 05 
66, 68, 69, 70, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 
86, 87, 88, 04, 06, 07 
Negative 
75, 76, 77, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 97, 
08, 09 
67, 71, 72, 90, 98, 99, 00, 01, 02, 03 
                                                 
5 The test was also applied with (a) only intercept as deterministic variable and (b) intercept and 
deviation of real GDP growth from sample average and inflation from threshold level; yet the 
outcome remained the same that is we failed to reject the null hypothesis. 
10  SBP Research Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 1, May, 2010 
Box 2a: Policy Response Matrix of Pakistan 
numbers represent end of fiscal year 
  Monetary policy 
  Contraction Expansion 
F
is
ca
l 
p
o
li
cy
 Contraction 68, 69, 76, 81, 82, 89, 94, 95, 97, 09 
71, 72, 77, 78, 80, 84, 87, 90, 92, 
93, 99, 01, 03, 04 
Expansion 70, 73, 74, 75, 85, 88, 91, 96, 98,  
06, 08 
66, 67, 79, 83, 86, 00, 02, 05, 07 
 
From the distribution of years as given in boxes 1a and 2a, the extent of 
coordination between the monetary and fiscal policies conditional upon the 
specific economic environment can be worked out as follows: 
 
n(PP ∩ CC) / n(PP) = 2 / 8 = 0.25 
n(PN ∩ CE) / n(PN) = 4 / 15 = 0.27     (2) 
n(NP ∩ EC) / n(NP) = 3 / 11 = 0.27 
n(NN ∩ EE) / n(NN) = 3 / 10 = 0.30 


 
 
The results show that the extent of monetary and fiscal policies coordination as 
revealed by changes in policy indicators conditional upon economic shocks has 
only been 0.27 during the sample period. The coordination between the two 
policies was the lowest (0.25) when both the real GDP growth and inflation were 
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high while it was the highest (0.3) when both growth and inflation were low. The 
revealed behavior of the two policies as observed during 1965 to 2009 is depicted 
in figure 2. The points above the line show the years when the coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policies was observed, whereas the points below the 
line show the years when the movements in two policy indicators were not in line 
with economic circumstances. 
 
Thus it is hard to regard monetary and fiscal policies moves as coordinated moves 
in Pakistan. It is also interesting to note that the extent of coordination does not 
improve even after the establishment of Monetary and Fiscal Policies Co-
ordination Board in 1994 through an amendment in Section 9B of the State Bank 
of Pakistan Act, 1956.
 6
  
 
The distribution of years in which coordination was observed into political and 
SBP governors’ regimes gives some interesting insights in behavior of the two 
policy institutions as given in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of instances of coordination in different regimes 
   
Total years in a  
regime 
Years of coordination 
Political regimes 
   1966-71 
 
6 1 
1972-77 
 
6 1 
1978-87 
 
10 5 
1988-99 
 
12 1 
2000-08   9 4 
SBP Governors * 
Mahbubur Raschid   (1968-71) 4 1 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan   (1972-75) 4 1 
S. Osman Ali   (1976-78) 2.5 1 
A.G.N. Kazai   (1979-86) 8 3 
V. A. Jafarey   (1987-88) 2 1 
I. A. Hanfi   (1989-93) 5 1 
Muhammad Yaqub   (1994-99) 6 0 
Ishrat Hussain   (2000-05) 6 3 
Shamshad Akhtar   (2006-09) 3 1 
* SBP governors with three or more years of service have been included. 
 
                                                 
6 This exercise was repeated with primary deficit as fiscal policy indicator. The key findings remain 
the same.   
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It appears that generally in military regimes, the two policies had coordinated 
moves; this could be one of the reasons for better economic performance, at least 
in terms of growth and macroeconomic stability, during such regimes.
7
  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The paper explores the existence of coordination between monetary and fiscal 
policies in Pakistan in addressing macroeconomic imbalances. Contrary to general 
perception, the paper establishes that monetary policy has been independent of the 
fiscal policy in Pakistan. Given the independence of the policies, the paper then 
works out the extent of coordination through movements of policy indicators in 
different economic scenarios during the period from 1965 to 2009. Four scenarios 
have been built up, viz. (a) high growth and high inflation, (b) high growth and 
low inflation, (c) low growth and high inflation and (d) low growth and low 
inflation. We postulate that monetary and fiscal policies would be coordinating 
when both are contractionary if scenario (a) prevails, expansionary if scenario (d) 
prevails and move in opposite directions if scenarios (b) and (c) prevail. With this 
set up, we have found that during the last 44 years, coordinating behavior of 
monetary and fiscal policies was observed only in 12 years. Thus in Pakistan, 
monetary and fiscal policies hardly coordinated each other to address economic 
issues. Even the establishment of Monetary and Fiscal Policies Coordination 
Board, through amendments in SBP Act in 1994 could not change the behavior of 
the two institutions. Interestingly, we could not observe even a single instance of 
coordination during late 1990s. The coordination between the two policies was 
relatively high during military regimes compared with democracies that could be 
another reason for usually echoing better economic performance in such regimes.  
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